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LAPSE, ABATEMENT AND ADEMPTION
THOMAS H. LEATH*
LAPSa
While the expression "lapse" has been used in various situations, it
is generally thought of in the case where the devisee or legatee dies
after the will is executed but before the death of the testator. When a
legacy or devise is extinguished by reason of the death of the beneficiary
before that of the testator, it is said to lapse, and the intended gifts are
known as lapsed legacies or devises.'
It is said that the intention of the testator as to whether there shall
be a lapse is controlling and such intent will be ascertained from the
four comers of the will.
2
The circumstances causing a lapse must be distinguished from the
situation where a beneficiary dies before the will is written. If the
legatee or devisee should die before the will is written, the legacy or
devise would be void and not lapsed.3 A lapsed gift is one which was
good at the date of the will but failed because of a subsequent occur-
rence. A void gift, on the other hand, is ineffective from the date of the
will. The antilapse statutes referred to hereafter apply only to lapsed
and not to void legacies and devises.4
A divorce does not necessarily render a devise or bequest either
void or lapsed. At common law in the absence of a contrary intent
apparent in the will a gift to one's spouse by name remains valid upon
a divorce after the execution of the will. To the contrary, the failure
of the testator to change his will after divorce when he had sufficient
time and opportunity to do so creates a presumption that his will ex-
pressed his wishes and intentions.5 However, in North Carolina G.S.
§ 31-5.4 provides that a divorce impliedly revokes a husband's gift to
his wife by a prior will.
In the event the beneficiary of an estate for life predeceases the
testator, the gift to the remainderman does not lapse but takes effect
immediately.6 By the same token if the remainderman predeceases the
testator survived by the life tenant, the estate of the life tenant will
not be destroyed.7
* Member of the Rockingham, N. C., Bar.
'2 MORDECAi, LAw L=crtEs 1136 (1916). However, lapses occur in nu-
merous other situations. See generally 57 AM. JUR. Wills § 1424 (1948).
'Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Shelton, 229 N.C. 150, 48 S.E.2d 41 (1948).
8 Scales v. Scales, 59 N.C. 163 (1860).
" Scales v. Scales, supra note 3; Lindsay v. Pleasants, 39 N.C. 320 (1846).
'E.g., In re Estate of Jones, 211 Pa. 364, 60 AtI. 915 (1905).
'Richmond v. Vanhouk, 38 N.C. 581 (1845).
' See Howell v. Mehegan, 174 N.C. 64, 93 S.E. 438 (1917).
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In the case of testamentary gifts to a class, such as "children" or
"grandchildren" of a designated individual, the death of one or more of
the members of the class after the execution of the will but prior to
the death of the testator does not result in a lapse of the share of the
deceased member. The share of the surviving members is simply en-
larged to embrace the share of the deceased member, for in the absence
of a contrary intention indicated in the will a testamentary class gift is
considered as including only those members of the class living at the
death of the testator.8
The gift to a class of persons must be clearly distinguished from a
gift to individuals nominatim. While a lapse does not occur in the
former, it does result in the latter when one or more of the named
beneficiaries predeceases the testator. As stated in Wooten v. Hobbs,9
It has been uniformly held with us that when a legacy or devise
is given to certain persons then in being by name, and any of
them die before the testator, those living will not take his share,
as survivors, but the legacy or devise will lapse, and go, as prop-
erty undisposed of by the testator, to the latter's next of kin,
unless otherwise provided by statute or unless other disposition
thereof be made by the will or a codicil, or in the absence of
contrary provisions in the will..
The recent case of Entwistle v. Covington,1" is a good illustration
of a lapse upon the death of named beneficiaries prior to the death of
the testator. The residuary clause of the will was as follows: "The
residue of my estate anything and everything of value I will and be-
queath to my sisters May S., Faith L. & Elna G. Covington. or to
those who reside at our home p!ace, Glenwood. at the time of my
death." Each of the sisters was living at the time of the execution of
the will but each predeceased the testator. Neither the testator nor his
sisters ever married or left issue. The brother of the testator and his
wife were allegedly living with the testator at Glenwood at the time
of the death of the latter. They contended they were entitled to the
residue of the estate because of their residence at Glenwood. Other
heirs and next of kin of the testator contended the word "those" as
used in the residuary clause referred only to the named sisters and that
a lapse resulted. It appeared from the evidence that the chief objects
of the testator's bounty were the three named sisters who lived with
him at Glenwood and that the dominant desire and purpose of the
testator was to so dispose of his property that the residuary estate
would go to the three named sisters and to the survivor or survivors
' Winston v. Webb, 62 N.C. 1 (1866); Long, Class Gifts it; North Carolina,
22 N.C.L. REv. 297, 316 (1944).
1 170 N.C. 211, 215, 86 S.E. 811, 813 (1915).
10250 N.C. 315, 108 S.E.2d 603 (1959).
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of them so long as they or any of them remained living and residing at
Glenwood. The court stated that, if any one of the three sisters named
had been living and residing at Glenwood at the time of testator's
death, she would have taken the I entire residuary estate. Thus it is
apparent that, by the addition of the words "or to those who reside at
our home place, Glenwood. at the time of death," the testator expressed
the intent that there should be no lapse if at least one of the named
sisters had been living and residing at Glenwood at the time of his
death. The court stated,
It is quite clear under our decisions that if the residuary clause
under consideration had bequeathed and devised the residuary
estate to the three sisters of the testator by name and had omitted
the clause "or to those who reside at our home place, Glenwood,
at the time of my death," there would have been no survivor-
ship; and as each one of the sisters died, prior to the death of
the testator, the bequest and devise to such deceased sister would
have lapsed and her share of the residuary estate would have
gone as intestate property. 1
The Court concluded that upon the death of the testator, his three
named sisters having predeceased him, the bequests and devises made
in the residuary clause lapsed, the residuary clause became ineffective,
and the "residuary estate thereupon descended by operation of law to
his heirs and next of kin."'
2
The question as to whether or not a bequest or devise shall lapse
is controlled by the intent of the testator.13 A substitution of another
beneficiary in case of the death of the original devisee or legatee would
be a clear expression of an intent that the original gift should not
lapse. Further, the so-called simultaneous death provisions now in-
serted in many wills by which the testator may establish a presumption
that the wife survived have been held to indicate an intention that the
gift to the wife should not lapse in the event of their dying in a com-
mon disaster.
14
Statutes have been enacted in North Carolina and in many other
jurisdictions to prevent in certain instances a strict application of the
common law doctrine of lapse. Before the adoption of these statutes,
the law was such that if a testator devised or bequeathed property to his
child and such child died during the life of the testator leaving issue
surviving, the devise or legacy would nevertheless lapse and pass under
the residuary clause of the will, if any; or, in the absence of a residuary
clause, it would be intestate property and would descend to the heirs
I Id. at 320, 108 S.E.2d at 607.12Id. at 321, 108 S.E.2d at 607.
13 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Shelton, 229 N.C. 150, 48 S.E.2d 41 (1948).
1 In the Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
at law or be distributed among the next of kin of the testator, in
accordance with the nature of the property.15
Prior to 1951 there were two antilapse statutes in North Carolina,
G.S. §§ 31-44 and -42.'l In effect G.S. § 31-44 provided that a devise
or bequest to a child or other issue of the testator should not lapse if
issue of the devisee or legatee survived the testator. G.S. § 31-42 as
it-existed prior to 1951 in effect provided that a "devise" which failed
for any reason should pass to the residuary devisee but that there
should be no lapse if the "devisee or legatee" would have been an heir
of the testator and such devisee or legatee left issue surviving the testa-
tor. Both of these statutes limited their effect by stating, "unless a
contrary intention shall appear by the will." As originally written
G.S. ,§ 31-42 provided a lapsed devise should "be included in the re-
siduary devise (if any) contained in such will" but made no mention
of lapsed legacies. A proviso was added to make it apply to legacies
of personal property as well as to devises of real property. G.S. § 31-
44, on the other hand, dealt with lapse of both real and personal prop-
erty, but made no express provision for passage under the residuary
clause (if any) of the will.
In order to overcome the problems arising out of these loosely
drawn statutes and to 'recognize and preserve the distinction between
real and personal property for purposes of devolution, the General
Assembly in 1951 repealed G.S. § 31-44 and completely revised G.S.
§ 31-42 so as to embrace all the statutory antilapse provisions in one
statute.
The current statute, G.S § 31-42, is divided into three sections.
"5Smith v. Smith, 58 N.C. 305 (1860).
"' In view of the fact that these two statutes have been repealed, they are set
forth below as a matter of historical interest.
G.S. § 31-44: "When any person, being a child or other issue of the testator,
to whom any real or personal estate shall be devised or bequeathed for any estate
or interest not determinable at or before the death of such person, shall die in
the lifetime of the testator, leaving issue, and any such issue of such person
shall be living at the death of the testator, such devise or bequest shall not lapse,
but shall take effect and vest a title to such estate in the issue surviving, if there
be any, in the same manner, proportions and estates as if the death of such person
had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary inten-
tion shall appear by the will."
G.S. § 31-42: "Unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will, such real
estate or interest therein as shall be comprised or intended to be comprised in
any devise in such will contained which shall fail or be void by reason of the
death of the devisee in the lifetime of the testator, or by reason of such devise
being contrary to law or otherwise incapable of taking effect, shall be included
in the residuary devise (if any) contained in such will: Provided, there shall be
no lapse of the devise or legacy by reason of the death of the devisee or legatee
during the life of the testator, if such devisee or legatee would have been an heir
at law or distributee of such testator had he died intestate, and if such devisee
or legatee shall leave issue surviving him; and if there is issue surviving, then
the said issue shall have the devise or bequest named in the will."
.'These two statutes as they existed prior to 1951. were held not to be interre-
Idted. Beach v. Gladstone, 207 N.C. 876, 178 S.E. 546 (1935).
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The first section deals with a devise to a person who predeceases the
testator leaving issue surviving and provides that the devise shall not
lapse but shall go to the surviving issue of the devisee where the
deceased devisee would have been an heir of the testator had he sur-
vived him and had there been no will. The second section deals with
legacies in essentially the same manner as the first section deals with
devises but preserves the distinction between devises of real property
and the bequests of personal property. The third section provides that
in the event of a lapse or failure to take effect for any other reason, the
devise or bequest shall, absent a contrary intent in the will, pass under
the residuary clause of the will, if any; in the absence of an applicable
residuary clause, the devise or bequest passes as in case of intestacy.
Good draftsmen in 1951 did an excellent job of clarifying the statu-
tory laws in North Carolina pertaining to lapses. Nevertheless, the
new Intestate Succession Act of 195917 would seem to demand further
revision of this statute to eliminate the distinction between real and
personal property for purposes of devolution. The case of Farnell v.
Dongan'8 is of particular interest in this respect. The testator devised
and bequeathed all of his property, both real and personal, to his wife,
to be hers absolutely. The wife predeceased the testator survived by
two of her children by a former marriage. There were no children
of the marriage to the testator. The testator was survived by brothers
and sisters and nieces and nephews as heirs at law. The children of
the wife by the former marriage contended that as the surviving issue
of their mother they were entitled under G.S. § 31-42 to all of the
property, both real and personal, which constituted the net estate of
the testator. On the other hand, heirs at law and next of kin of the
testator contended they were entitled to all of the property, real and
personal, and that the provisions of the antilapse statute were not appli-
cable. The court held that since she would not have been an heir of her
deceased husband and since she predeceased him, the statute was not
applicable as to the real property; therefore, the devise lapsed and the
real property descended to the brothers and sisters and nieces and
nephews. However, since she would have been a distributee of the
estate of the testator had she been living at his death and had he died
intestate, and having left issue surviving her, the legacy did not lapse
and the personal property must be distributed to the issue of the de-
ceased wife.
G.S. § 29-2 (of the 1959 Intestate Succession Act) defines "heir"
as "any person entitled to take real or personal property upon intestacy
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 29 (Supp. 1959). See generally McCall, Bolich &
Wiggins, North Carolina's New Intestate Succession Act, 39 N.C.L. REv. 1(1961) .(16207 N.C. 611, 178 S.E. 77 (1935).
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under the provisions of this chapter." G.S. § 29-3(1) provides that
in .determining those who take upon intestate succession there is no
distinction between real and personal property. Thus it would appear
that if Farnell v. Dongan were decided today the issue of the deceased
widow by a former marriage would take both real and personal property
to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters and nieces and nephews of
the testator, he having left no issue and having failed to express in his
will any contrary intent. If this be the case, further statutory revision
should be considered.
If there is no indication in the will to the contrary, and even with-
out statutory provision, lapsed legacies and devices pass as a part of
the residuum or, in the absence of a residuary clause, the subject matter
passes as intestate property.19 Nevertheless, G.S. § 31-42.2 fixes the
devolution of property which fails by reason of lapse or any other
cause on account of the prior death of the beneficiary. The intent of
the testator as expressed in or determined from his will governs. The
general principle that a lapsed or ineffectual gift passes under the
residuary clause in the absence of contrary context is applicable even
in the situation where the donee is also named as a residuary bene-
ficiary.
20
In determining the applicabi lity of the antilapse statute, those who
would have been distributees of the estate had the testator died intestate
must be determined as of the date of the death of the testator and not
as of the date of the execution of the will.21
It should be borne in mind that only the issue of the beneficiary who
predeceased the testator are benefitted by the antilapse statute. Col-
lateral kindred of the deceased beneficiary will not by virtue of the
statute take the property from the testator even though such collateral
kin would have been the heirs of the testator had the testator died
intestate after the death of the named beneficiary.2
There is a division of authority as to whether antilapse statutes
apply to class gifts. In a few states such statutes embrace gifts to a
class specificially.2 Though in some states the general antilapse statutes
have been construed as not being applicable to class gifts, 24 it is gen-
erally held today that antilapse statutes do apply to class gifts.2 5 Neither
" Stevenson v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 202 N.C. 92, 161 S.E. 728 (1932).
" Sorrey v. Bright, 21 N.C. 13 (1835)." Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Shelton, 229 N.C. 150, 48 S.E2d 41 (1948).
"Daniel v. Bass, 193 N.C. 294, 136 S.E. 733 (1927).
SE.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 394.410 (1959), which provides that the share of
a deceased class-member shall pass to his issue unless he dies without issue, in
which case the common law rule applies to prevent a lapse.
" E.g., Campbell v. Clark, 64 N.H. 328, 10 Atl. 702 (1887).
"E.g., In re Scheidrs Estate, 89 Cal. App. 2d 488, 201 P.2d 58 (1948) ; Clif-
ford v. Cronin, 92 Conn. 434, 117 Atl. 489 (1922); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948
(1957).
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the current North Carolina antilapse statute nor the earlier ones are
made applicable to class gifts specificially.28 On the theory that a gift
to a class by definition is not intended by the testator to include any
persons answering the class designation who predecease him, it would
seem that such statutes should not be made applicable to class gifts
either specificially or by construction.
ABATEMENT
The problem of abatement arises when the assets of an estate are
insufficient to pay the debts of the decedent, the costs of administration
including estate taxes, and all of the legacies and devises. The insuf-
ficiency of funds or property may be caused in various ways. How-
ever it is caused beneficiaries may not receive anything until such debts
and expenses are paid in full. Dean Mordecai in commenting on the
principles of abatement said, "A man is required to be just before he is
generous, and, therefore, his debts must be paid before his property is
turned over to the objects of his bounty.1
2 7
The intention of the testator as indicated in his will controls as
between the beneficiaries in case abatement becomes necessary. Un-
fortunately the testator and the draftsman of the will all too often do
not provide or even imply what is to be done in case of an insufficiency
of assets.
Where the testator fails to express in his will any intention as to the
abatement of legacies and devises for the payment of debts, the follow-
ing rules generally apply:
1. Residuary legacies must first be exhausted.28
2. General and demonstrative legacies will be resorted to for pay-
ment of debts before specific legacies may be encroached upon.2 9
3. In the case of demonstrative legacies where the fund designated
for their payment is in existence at the death of the testator, it is some-
times held that they abate ratably with specific legacies.30 On the other
hand, where the fund out of which the demonstrative legacy is to be
paid is not in existence at the death of the testator, the demonstrative
legacies abate with the general legacies.31
"'It seems implicit in the case of Stevenson v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
202 N.C. 92, 161 S.E. 728 (1932), that North Carolina adheres to the view that
our antilapse statute is inapplicable to class gifts.72 MORDECAI, LAW LncrTuEs 1136 (1916).
"8Smith v. Livermore, 298 Mass. 223, 10 N.E.2d 117 (1937); Nickerson v.
Bragg, 21 R.I. 296, 43 AUt. 539 (1899).
" Heath v. McLaughlin, 115 N. C. 398, 20 S.E. 519 (1894); Annot., 101
A.L.R. 704, 712 (1936).
'0 Matthews v. Targarona, 104 Md. 442, 65 Atl. 60 (1906); Note, 10 Ann.
Cas. 158 (1908).
" Gelbach v. Shivley, 67 Md. 501, 10 Atl. 247 (1887); O'day v. O'day, 193
Mo. 62, 91 S.W. 921 (1906) (dictum).
19611
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4. As between legacies of the same class, general, demonstrative or
specific, abatement is pro rata.
3 2
5. The majority of the modem decisions hold that specific legacies
and-specific devises abate ratably on the theory there is no reason to
presume that a testator, in the absence of expression in his will, in-
tended to favor one class of property over the other.33 The minority
view adheres to the principle that inasmuch as personal property is the
primary source for the payment of debts, specific legacies should abate
before specific devises.3 4 In view of G.S. § 28-81 which provides for
the sale of realty to pay debts only where the personalty is insufficient,
it appears North Carolina will continue to abide by the minority view."1
The only recent change in this statute was to delete that portion relat-
ing to dower. North Carolina even goes so far as to hold that the
personalty of a decedent must be applied to the payment of his debts
to the exoneration of the real property to satisfy a lien on the latter.80
6. The testator may in his will fix the order of abatement as he
chooses when the assets are insufficient to pay debts, and his intent will
prevail over the general rules of law.
37
ADEMPTION
Although the principle of ademption is firmly imbedded in the law
of wills, the term "ademption" is very difficult to define in a thoroughly
satisfactory and all inclusive manner, as will be noted from the follow-
ing attempts:
When a legacy is taken away or revoked by the testator, such
act of the testator is said to be an ademption of the legacy.3 8
The extinction of a specific legacy by the testator's parting
with the subject thereof during his life.
3 9
Ademption is the extinction or satisfaction of a legacy by
some act of a testator, which is equivalent to a revocation of the
bequest or indicates the intention to revoke ....
The foregoing definitions may be criticized because they fail to
recognize that ademption may occur by the destruction or extinction
of the subject matter during the life of the testator without any action
82 Balinger's Devisees v. Balinger's Adm'r, 251 Ky. 405, 65 S.W.2d 49 (1933).
2 Baker v. Baker, 319 II. 320, 150 N.E. 284 (1925) ; O'day v. O'day, 193 Mo.
62, 91 S.W. 921 (1906).
Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1519, 1523 (1926), and cases there cited.
Baptist Female Univ. v. Borden, 132 N.C. 477, 44 S.E. 47 (1903).
" Rouse v. Rouse, 237 N.C. 492, 75 S.E.2d 300 (1953).
37Robards v. Wortham, 17 N.C. 173 (1831).
82 MORDECAI, LAW LE:cvuEs 1136 (1916).
88 CycLopamic LAw DxcroNRMY 30 (3d ed. 1940).
,0 Burnham v. Comfort, 108 N.Y. 535, 539, 15 N.E. 710, 711 (1888).
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or intent on his part. Further, as is seen, some do not necessarily
embrace the ademption of a devise by its alienaion during the life of
the testator.
The term "ademption" has been held by a New York court not
to apply to devises,41 yet North Carolina and many other jurisdictions
apply the term to devises as well.42 To express the matter simply, if
the subject matter of a particular legacy or devise is not in existence as
a part of the testator's assets at the time of his death, it would be
adeemed.
An ademption of a devise or legacy may result from various causes
and circumstances. Thus in the case of gifts of specific property, an
ademption is caused by the nonexistence of the property at testator's
death or its consumption, loss, disposal by sale, gift or other alienation,
or change in form, during the lifetime of the testator. In the case of
general or pecuniary legacies, ademption results from a gift or advance
by the testator to a beneficiary mentioned in his will, made either in
cash or by the forgiveness of an indebtedness. 43 If there is an ademp-
tion, the beneficiary is barred from claiming the gift, except such por-
tion thereof as the testator possessed at the time of his death.44 A testa-
tor cannot give what he does not own at the time of his death.
The question of whether or not the testamentary disposition was
adeemed by gift during the lifetime of the testator is a matter of intent.4r
The'court will adjudge the question as a matter of law when the facts
are clear. In doubtful cases, however, evidence will be heard to ascertain
the intent with which the gift was made. 46 This principle has been ap-
plied in the case of a gift of money.
47
Some jurisdictions hold that the question of ademption of a legacy
or devise by alienation or extinction also depends ultimately on the
intention of the testator.48 North Carolina holds it to be a rule of law
A'Ibid.'"E.g., Perry v. Perry, 175 N.C. 141, 95 S.E. .98 (1918) ; Annot., 30 A.L.R.
676, 680 (1924).
"3 Grogan v. Ashe, 156 N.C. 286, 72 S.E. 372 (1911) ; Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 9
(1952).
4' In the case of general legacies, the earlier view was that any payment to
the legatee resulted in total ademption. Johnson v. McDowell, 154 Iowa 38,
134 N.W. 419 (1912) ; Low v. Low, 77 Me. 37 (1885). However, where the pay-
ment to the legatee was substantially less than the amount of the legacy, the
tendency is to hold the ademption pro tanto. In re Percival's Estate, 79 Misc.
567, 141 N.Y. Supp. 180 (1913). On the other hand, ademption by alienation or
extinguishment is generally conceded to be pro tanto only. Murphy v. Boling,
273 Ky. 827, 117 S.W2d 962 (1938).
4' The doctrine of ademption by gift is closely related to the question of ad-
vancement under the law relating to intestacy. Generally it would seem that the
same intent would be required for either.
" Grogan v. Ashe, 156 N.C. 286, 72 S.E. 372 (1918).
,7 Ibid.
'"Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 Fed. 896 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 217 U.S.
606 (1910) ; cases discussed in Annot., 30 A.L.R. 676 (1924).
1961]
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rather than one of particular intent of the testator,4 ' although it also
places much emphasis on the intent of the testator.50
In considering ademption, it must be borne in mind that the will
speaks as of the death of the testator. In harmony with this rule of
law it is provided by statute that the conveyance of property after the
execution of the will and before the death of the testator will not
create an ademption if the testator re-acquired the property prior to
his death. Moreover, even without the aid of a statute, where certain
notes were bequeathed and the testator before his death accepted new
notes in lieu thereof, the North Carolina court held that ademption did
not result but that the new notes passed to the legatee.5 1
Ademption does not apply to general or demonstrative legacies,
for such do not refer to particular property at the testator's death since
they are payable from general assets of the estate.
"' Green v. Green, 231 N.C. 707, 58 S.E2d 722 (1950). The proposition that
the ademption of specific legacies or devises is a rule of law seems to rest on
the very practical consideration that either the testator owned the property at his
death or he did not.
" King v. Sellers, 194 N.C. 533, 140 S.E. 91 (1927).
" Rue v. Connell, 148 N.C. 302, 62 S.E. 306 (1908).
